

## Political Dynamics of 2013 and 2022 APBD Discussion in Blora Regency (Case Study of Delayed APBD Determination and Timely APBD Determination)

\*<sup>1</sup>Abdul Muiz,<sup>2</sup>Didik G Suharto,<sup>3</sup>Rino Ardhan Nugroho

<sup>1</sup>Magister Public Administration, FISIP, Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>Magister Public Administration, FISIP, Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta, Indonesia

<sup>3</sup>Magister Public Administration, FISIP, Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta, Indonesia

Author's email:

[1abdulmuizh18@gmail.com](mailto:abdulmuizh18@gmail.com), [aizhwolulas@student.uns.ac.id](mailto:aizhwolulas@student.uns.ac.id),

[2didikgusuharto@staff.uns.ac.id](mailto:didikgusuharto@staff.uns.ac.id), [3rinoan.staff.uns.ac.id](mailto:rinoan.staff.uns.ac.id)

\*Corresponding author: [1abdulmuizh18@gmail.com](mailto:abdulmuizh18@gmail.com), [aizhwolulas@student.uns.ac.id](mailto:aizhwolulas@student.uns.ac.id)

**Abstract.** *The Regional Income and Expenditure Budget (APBD) is a revenue and expenditure plan for the regional government for one fiscal year stipulated in regional regulations (Perda). The regional head and the DPRD are required to jointly approve the draft regional regulation on APBD no later than one month or in December before the start of the next fiscal year each year. APBD is an instrument used by local governments to carry out governance and development, including public services. In the history of the determination of the APBD in Blora Regency, the period from 2002 to 2023 was marked by delays in the determination from 2002 to 2015 or 13 consecutive years. Then from 2016 to 2023 the determination of the APBD in Blora Regency is no longer too late. This study aims to describe the political dynamics that occurred between the legislature and the executive in the 2013 APBD discussions when the APBD was set late and in the 2022 APBD discussions when the APBD was set on time. This research uses a case study qualitative method in the Blora Regency Government using a qualitative research method through documentation and in-depth interviews with informants who have competence related to the discussion process up to the determination of the APBD in Blora Regency in both categories or periodization. Furthermore, the data were analyzed using the Miles and Hubberman technique. The results of the study show that during the discussion of the APBD there was a conflict of interest with the budgeting cooperation of budget actors (executive and legislative) in the process of discussing the APBD in Blora Regency 2013 and 2022.*

**Keyword :** Political Dynamics, APBD, Blora

### 1. INTRODUCTION

APBD is an important instrument in regional development. Therefore, the central government requires district and city governments in Indonesia to determine the APBD no later than one month before the start of the fiscal year each year. The APBD must be jointly approved by the regional head and DPRD. However, to arrive at the determination of the APBD, the process of preparation and discussion must be passed. It is in the discussion process by the actors (executive and legislative) that tough and dynamic debates often occur. This is due to the limited financial resources owned by the government in each region. In this situation, budgeting in the public sector becomes an arena for competition between actors (Wildavsky and Caider, 2004).

Blora Regency in Central Java Province for 13 years from 2002 to 2015 scored a bad history by being late in establishing the APBD. In 2012 elements of the community acting on behalf of the DPRD Blora Fans Club presented a charter with a record for

delays in determining the APBD to the DPRD and Pemkab Blora (Suara Merdeka, 5 March 2012). The Central Java Committee for Investigation and Eradication of Nepotism Collusion (KP2KKN) said that due to delays in establishing the 2012 APBD, the government imposed sanctions on the Blora Regency Government in the form of delaying the disbursement of general allocation funds (DAU) of around IDR 14 billion out of a total DAU of IDR 673 billion. Even though there were several demonstrations by the public, the fact is that Blora's APBD was always late in being set until 2015. It's just that in line with the strict sanctions given by the government to regions that were late in setting their APBD, since 2016 Blora's APBD has been set on time. The strict sanction refers to Law number 23/2014 concerning Regional Government, namely non-payment of salaries for regional heads and DPRD's for six months.

Nevertheless, the discussions on the APBD in the following years in Blora were still marred by tough debate by actors with various interests, even though in the end they were able to decide on time. This is because the APBD is the embodiment of the regional head's vision and mission in a policy that goes hand in hand with the aspirations of the community voiced through their representatives in the legislature. Samodra Wibawa (2011) states, public policy is a decision in the political system to manage a problem to fulfill an interest which in its implementation requires resources in the political system. Charles Lindblom stated that the formulation of public policy is a very complex and analytical political process that does not know when it begins and ends (Novita Tresiana and Noverman Duaji, 2017).

This research wants to describe the political dynamics in Blora Regency that occurred during the discussion of the APBD in Blora Regency when the APBD was set late in 2013 and when the APBD was set on time in 2022. The instrument used is a public policy formulation model with a public choice theory approach, system model and agency theory. In fact, there has been quite a lot of research on the political dynamics of APBD preparation in regions in Indonesia. It's just that this research only takes one side when the APBD is set late. While other studies with objects when the APBD is set on time.

## **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Political Dynamics**

According to Dwiyanto (2002), political dynamics describe the extent to which the ongoing political process reflects democratization and accountability. According to Agustino (2009), political dynamics are related to issues of participation and democracy. Ramlan Surbakti (1992) classifies political participation into two, namely active participation and passive participation. Active participation is an activity oriented to political input and output processes. Active participation is realized, among others, by submitting suggestions regarding a general policy, proposing alternative public policies that are different from those made by the government, submitting criticism and improvements to rectify policies, paying taxes and electing government leaders. Meanwhile, passive participation is an activity that is oriented to the output process.

Political dynamics cannot be separated from political concepts, namely decisions and policies. Before a decision is made, it is necessary to carry out a decision-making process (Budiardjo, 1988). This policy or *beleid* is interpreted by Budiardjo as a collection of decisions taken by an actor or by a political group in an effort to choose goals and ways to achieve those goals. According to Budiardjo, this policy will be achieved when individuals in society have a common goal. In a sense, to achieve these common goals, the government needs to determine binding plans which are then issued in the form of policies.


From these definitions it can be concluded that political dynamics are attitudes, movements or behavior of individuals or groups in the political system that can influence decision-making by authorized institutions.

## **2.2 Public Policy Formulation**

### **2.2.1 System Models**

Budiardjo (1988) included David Easton's opinion regarding policy in this political sphere. David Easton offers a systems model approach in public policy formulation. This model consists of three components, namely input, process and output.

The formulation of public policy with this system model shows that policy is the result (output) of the political system which consists of input, throughput and output. Input consists of demands and supports that are processed in political institutions to produce decisions. Thus, a policy is formulated from a public problem that gets the attention of the government so that the government puts it into a policy, one of which is in the form of laws and regulations.



**Fixture 2.1** : Political system models (*David Easton, 1988*)

### **2.2.2 Public Choice Model**

Rubin (2016) identifies five budgeting methods: Reformism, progressive negotiation, the role of interest groups, the budget process itself and political debate. At the same time, Fozzard notes that there are five main perspectives in the process of resource allocation, namely commercial, rational, incremental, public choice, and key actors (Farhan, 2018). Buchanan (1999) argues that public choice theory is primarily a set of approaches and methods developed at an analytical level and applying these tools and methods to the political sector of government or public finance.

This theory focuses on the behavior of public policy makers who are interested in maximizing the utility of individuals who motivate them to act in their own self-interest. Public choice theory states that the budget is the result of negotiations between political actors who act voluntarily and institutions that regulate their interactions. This model of public policy-making sees politics as a process in which collective decisions of those who have an interest in these decisions are formed. The public choice approach assumes that individuals are motivated by self-interest. Therefore, self-interest obliges politicians to allocate budgets for certain groups in their constituencies.

### **2.2.3 Agency Theory**

Agency theory explains the relationship between parties who work together. One party is the principal, namely the party that delegates decision-making authority to another party. Meanwhile, the other party is the agent, namely the party carrying out work or duties for the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency relationship arises from

an agreement between the principal and the agent that transfers some of the decision-making power to the agent. Contractually, some decisions can be assumed to empower agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, due to differences in interests, conflicts of interest arise between principals and agents. (Hill, C.W. and Jones, 1992).

Bergman and Lane (1990) explain that agency theory can be applied to public organizations. According to him, in a democracy it is based on a series of principal-agent relations. According to Halim and Abdullah (2006), the influence of agency theory in the budget process can be seen from two perspectives, namely the relationship between the people and the legislature and between the legislature and the executive. When viewed from the agency relationship between the legislature and the executive, the executive is the agent and the legislature is the principal. According to Fadzil and Nyoto (2011) in regional budgeting, agency relations create information asymmetry that leads to multiple behaviors such as moral hazard, competitive choice, and opportunistic behavior.

Based on the opinions of the experts above, it can be concluded that agency theory explains the relationship between principal and agent. Agency theory provides insight into contractual arrangements between two or more individuals, groups, or organizations. According to this theory, one party (principal) makes a contract with another party (agent), either implicitly or directly, with the hope that the agent will act or do as the principal wants.

### **3. RESEARCH METHODS/METHODOLOGY**

This research was conducted for two months between January and February 2023 in Blora Regency, Central Java Province. The research sites were selected in a targeted way, ie. H.'s place is consciously chosen from a certain point of view (Sugiyono, 2019). In particular, Blora Regency is one of the administrative regions in Indonesia that has experienced delays in determining the APBD for 13 consecutive years from 2002 to 2015. Meanwhile, Blora Regency from 2016 to 2023 is the area that will determine the APBD on time.

This research simultaneously explores the political dynamics that occur when the APBD is set late in 2013 and when the 2022 APBD is set on time. One of the reasons for choosing these two years was because they were in the middle of the tenure of state administrators and the DPRD. So there is a possibility that the budget will focus more on development rather than election preparation. In addition, it is also possible that both parties have sufficient experience in preparing, discussing and establishing APBD.

Qualitative research methods are used in this research. Bogdan and Taylor in Moleong (2017) stated that the qualitative method is a research method for obtaining descriptive data in written or spoken sentences and observing human behavior. This approach targets backgrounds and individuals holistically (overall). In qualitative research, researchers enter certain social situations, make observations, and interview people who are believed to have knowledge about these social situations. In this study, as a purposive sampling method, informants were selected who were considered to have expertise in the process of discussing the determination of the Blora Regency APBD (primary data). The main informants of this study are DPRD chairmen consisting of chairpersons and deputy chairmen for the 2019-2024 period, and former DPRD chairmen for the 2014-2019 period. Apart from that, another key whistleblower is DPRD members who are members of the DPRD Budget Agency (Banggar). Meanwhile, at the Administration level, the key informants for the study were the Regent, Regional Secretary and officials of the 2015 and 2022 Regional Government Budget Team (TAPD). In addition, secondary data was also obtained from literature reviews, archives and documents. and library materials.

The collected data is verified by triangulation. This study uses methodological triangulation techniques, collecting information through interviews, observation and documentary data. Triangulation was carried out by comparing the results of key informant interviews and comparing the results of observations, interviews and document analysis. In research, research data collected through observation, interviews, literature and documentation are analyzed carefully and systematically to obtain in-depth and comprehensive studies. The data analysis method used in this study is the Miles and Huberman analysis method.

This study examines the qualitative aspects which consist of the involvement of legislative and executive stakeholders as well as community participation in the formulation of policies up to the determination of the Blora Regency APBD. The process of proposing a budget to the determination of the budget. Likewise the relationship between the DPRD and the executive in formulating policies or in discussing the Blora Regency APBD.

#### **4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Article 1 paragraph 2 of Law (UU) number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government states that regional government is the administration of government affairs by the Regional Government and the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) according to the principle of autonomy and co-administration with the principle of widest autonomy in the system and principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. DPRDs and regional heads are domiciled as elements of regional government administration who are given a mandate by the people to carry out government affairs delegated to the regions. Thus, the DPRD and the regional head are positioned as equal partners who have different functions. DPRD has the function of forming regional regulations (perda), budgeting and oversight. Meanwhile, regional heads carry out the implementation function of regional regulations and regional policies.

The Regional Government and DPRD have the authority to regulate and manage the interests of the people in their area. In carrying out this authority, the Regional Government and DPRD need to formulate public policies, which among other things are contained in regional regulations as a public policy. One of the products of public policy formulation in the regions is regional regulations regarding the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD).

APBD is the annual financial plan of the Regional Government which is approved by DPRD. The regional financial plan is stipulated by regional regulations. APBD consists of revenue budget, expenditure budget, and financing. This is as stated in Law Number 17 of 2003 concerning State Finance and Law number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government. Thus the APBD is an instrument used by the Regional Government to administer government, carry out development and serve the public. It contains a regional revenue and expenditure budget plan for development and financing the implementation of program activities within the framework of public services every year.

Article 65 of Law number 23 of 2014 explains that regional heads, among other things, have the task of compiling and submitting draft regional regulations on APBD, draft regional regulations on changes to APBD, and draft regional regulations on accountability for APBD implementation to DPRD for joint discussion. In carrying out these tasks, the regional head, among other things, has the authority to stipulate regional regulations that have been jointly approved by the DPRD. Article 149 states that the Regency/Municipal DPRD has the function of forming regional regulations, budgeting and oversight. These three functions are carried out within the framework of people's representation. The function of forming regional regulations by the DPRD is

carried out by discussing with the regional heads and approving or disapproving the draft regional regulations. The function of the budget is manifested in the form of discussions for joint approval of the regional regional budget draft regulations submitted by the regional head. The budget function is carried out by discussing the draft regional regulation on the APBD. In this regard, a relationship will be built between the regional head and the DPRD in conducting discussions up to the determination of the APBD. Article 207 of Law number 23 of 2014 states that the working relationship between DPRD and regional head is based on equal partnership. This partnership relationship is manifested in the form of mutual agreement, among others, in the formation of regional regulations.

Regional regulations (Perda) regarding APBD, which are products of public policy, are made by government institutions and their officials through a political process. This is in line with Thomas R Dye's statement as quoted by Islamy (2009) which states that the agent as a public policy maker is the government. According to Dye, public policy includes the fundamental choice of the government to do something or not to do something and the decision is made by government officials or government agencies.

David Easton as quoted by Agustino (2008) gives a definition of public policy as "*the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society*". This definition emphasizes that only the government as the owner of authority in the political system can do something for its people. This is because the government is included in the "*authorities in a political system*", namely the rulers in the political system who are involved in the daily affairs of the political system and have the responsibility to make decisions that apply to society within a certain period of time.

To carry out these responsibilities, local governments, among other things, allocate budgets to carry out developments regulated in regional regulations regarding APBD. The budget is a tool for the government to carry out all obligations, promises and policies into concrete and integrated plans in terms of what actions will be taken, what results will be achieved at what cost and who will pay those costs (Dobell & Ulrich, 2002) . Budgeting in the public sector is a bargaining process between the executive and the legislature as stated by Hagen et al. (1996), Wildavsky and Caider (2004), Howlett et al. (1995). This was due to the government's limited budget.

Related to the limited budgetary resources owned by the government, according to Ramlan Surbakti (1992), it is a matter that often causes political conflicts that occur between groups in the process of making a policy. This happens because each group seeks to obtain and/or maintain the same resources and the number is limited. According to Ramlan Surbakti (1992) political conflict ends when a joint consensus has been reached between political actors in a policy making. A political dynamic will occur in the APBD determination process because of these limited budgetary resources. Political dynamics in this context is interpreted as a movement or force that is developing in political life in the region in the process of discussion up to the determination of the APBD.

In the process of determining the APBD, participation is embodied in a number of stages that must be passed before the draft regional budget regulation is enacted into a regional regulation. Starting from planning in the regional development planning meeting (Musrebang), preparation, discussion to the establishment of regional regulations. APBD is prepared in accordance with the needs of government administration and the ability of regional revenues. The drafting of the APBD is guided by the regional government work plan (RKPD) in order to achieve the goals of the state. It is in this RKPD that the vision and mission of the local government are reflected. The regional government then conveys the general policies of the APBD in line with the RKPD as the basis for preparing the RAPBD to the DPRD. The DPRD then discusses the general policy of the APBD proposed by the local government. Based on the general APBD policy that has been agreed upon with the DPRD, the regional government together with the DPRD discuss priorities and temporary budget ceilings to be used as

a reference for each regional apparatus organization (OPD). The discussion on the draft regional budget regulation is carried out in accordance with the law governing the composition and position of the DPRD. DPRD can submit proposals that cause changes in receipts and expenditures in the draft regional budget.

The process of preparing, discussing and determining the APBD refers to the applicable laws and regulations. The legal regulations from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) as the technical basis for preparing the APBD undergo changes every year, namely in the form of Minister of Home Affairs Regulations (Permendagri), Decrees of the Minister of Home Affairs (Kemendagri), Circular Letters (SE). The regulation states that the time limit for determining the APBD is that the regional regulation on the APBD must be enacted no later than one month before the end of the current fiscal year.

In 2002, based on article 23 of the Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs (Kepmendagri) number 29 of 2002 concerning Guidelines for Management, Accountability and Supervision of Regional Finances as well as Procedures for Preparing APBD, Implementation of Regional Financial Administration and Compilation of APBD Calculations, it was stated that the draft regional regulation on APBD approved by the DPRD, ratified by the regional head to become a regional regulation regarding the APBD no later than one month after the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) is stipulated. Law number 29 of 2002 concerning the 2003 budget year budget was stipulated on December 24, 2002. So that district and city budgets should be determined no later than January 24, 2003 or one month after the APBN was stipulated.

From 2002 to 2015 Blora Regency was a district in Central Java Province which was always late in establishing the APBD. In fact, at that time Blora Regency was in the top three national rankings with the latest APBD determination.

#### **Determination of Blora Regency APBD from 2002 to 2015**

Material	Determination Date
APBD 2002	2 Mei 2002
APBD 2003	6 Juni 2003
APBD 2004	28 Mei 2004
APBD 2005	31 Mei 2005
APBD 2006	9 Mei 2006
APBD 2007	14 Juni 2007
APBD 2008	29 April 2008
APBD 2009	7 Juni 2009
APBD 2010	23 Maret 2010
APBD 2011	26 April 2011
APBD 2012	13 April 2012
APBD 2013	24 April 2013
APBD 2014	12 Juni 2014
APBD 2015	20 Januari 2015

Table 1. Source: Data processed from the Regional Gazette of Blora Regency

The determination of the APBD in Blora Regency, which was always late, started from 2002 to 2015 during the leadership of three regents, namely:

1. Regent Ir. H. Basuki Widodo who served as regent of Blora from 2000 to 2010. Regent Basuki Widodo was promoted by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) in his first period as regent (1999-2004). Then in the second period (2005-2010) his nomination as regent was carried out by the Golkar Party.
2. Regent R.M Yudhi Sancoyo who served as regent of Blora in 2007-2010. He replaced the old Blora regent, Ir. H. Basuki Widodo who died of illness. R.M Yudhi Sancoyo is the chairman of the Blora Golkar Party.

3. Regent Djoko Nugroho (supported by the Democratic Party, the National Awakening Party, the United Development Party) who served as regent of Blora from 2010 to 2015.

While from the legislative side, in the period 2002-2015 there were four leadership periods. Namely, for the 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 periods the Blora DPRD was chaired by HM Warsit from the PDIP, for the 2009-2014 period it was chaired by H Maulana Kusnanto from the Golkar Party. Whereas for the 2014-2019 period the Blora DPRD was chaired by H Bambang Susilo from the Democratic Party.

The delay in setting the APBD, which seemed to be a tradition in Blora Regency in the 2002-2015 period, was solved by Acting (Acting) Regent Ihwan Sudrajat. Governor Ganjar Pranowo, when appointed as Acting Regent of Blora by Governor Ganjar Pranowo on September 1 2015, was assigned to end the tradition of setting Blora's regional budget which was always late. The task was successfully carried out properly. The draft regional regulation on the Blora Regency APBD for the 2016 fiscal year which was drawn up when Ihwan Sudrajat was in charge of Blora was stipulated to become the regional regulation for the 2016 regional budget at the plenary meeting of the Blora DPRD on 13 November 2015 or one month before the deadline for the 2015 fiscal year. The chairman of the DPRD at that time was H Bambang Susilo from the Democratic Party.

The timely determination of the APBD was forwarded by Regent Djoko Nugroho who was re-elected as regent of Blora for the 2015-2019 period. Paired with Deputy Regent H Arief Rohman, he is supported by the Nasdem Party, PKB, and the Hanura Party. In the second period of Djoko Nugroho's leadership, there were no more delays in determining the APBD. The chairman of the Blora DPRD for the 2014-2019 period was held by H Bambang Susilo (Democrat) and for the 2019-2024 period chaired by HM Dasum (PDIP).

Blora Regency now has a new regent, namely H Arief Rohman. H Arief Rohman previously served as deputy regent of Blora in the 2015-2019 period or when Djoko Nugroho was regent. Paired with candidate for deputy regent Tri Yuli Setyowati (PDIP), H Arief Rohman (candidate for regent with PKB background) won the Pilkada Blora December 9 2020. Pairs H Arief Rohman-Tri Yuli Setyowati were sworn in as regent and deputy regent of Blora on Friday 26 February 2021. Year 2021 is the first year for H Arief Rohman to carry out his duties as regent, including preparing the budget in the 2022 APBD.

**Determination of Blora Regency APBD from 2015 to 2023**

Material	Determination Date
APBD 2016	13 November 2015
APBD 2017	30 November 2016
APBD 2018	30 November 2017
APBD 2019	26 November 2018
APBD 2020	29 November 2019
APBD 2021	30 November 2020
APBD 2022	29 November 2021
APBD 2023	29 November 2022

Table 2. Source: Data processed from the Regional Gazette of Blora Regency

The agency relationship between parliament and the executive is bound by an agreement in the form of a regional budget regulation, which is a tool for parliament to control the implementation of the executive budget (Halim and Abdullah, 2006). According to Fadzil and Nyoto. (2011), agency relationships in the preparation of regional budgets create information asymmetry that leads to various behaviors such as moral hazard, controversial decisions, and opportunistic behavior. The existence of DPRD members who represent the aspirations of the people and regional heads who are elected by the people should fight for the APBD for the benefit of the



community. However, all the boundaries between the interests of society and the interests of the executive and legislature make it difficult to find real common interests.

Executives tend to have better knowledge of budgets, regulations, and information about local finances than DPRD. This is related to the fact that the executive as executor of the budget, carries out government functions in all fields, including public services. This is one of the triggers for opportunistic behavior by executives. If that happens, they tend to submit a bigger budget than the current budget realization. On the one hand, they also want a lower revenue budget target so that the target is easier to achieve (Halim & Abdullah, 2006). Almost every year, executives submitting plans for regional original revenue (PAD) targets in Blora Regency as stipulated in the draft regional budget (APBD) are deemed too small by the DPRD. DPRD wants the target to be increased. Debates on PAD targets often color discussions in the DPRD. Until it is agreed that the PAD target will change or increase from the executive's initial proposal.

Meanwhile, the opportunistic behavior of parliament is based on the functions of DPRD members, namely the function of legislation, budgeting and supervision to enable opportunistic legislative activities. The legislature tries to fight for the interests of its budget in line with the interests of the people it represents. When in fact it is only camouflage to advance his personal interests. The end result of the consequences of individual behavior in compiling and establishing the budget is a loss for the region and society (Jumaidi, 2014). The Blora regency executive is aware of this. A compromise was offered. The legislature can still propose a budget to accommodate the interests of its constituents. It's just that the budget allocation is adjusted to the financial capacity of the region and is also in line with the vision and mission of regional development.

Both parties realize that if opportunistic behavior of the executive and legislature occurs continuously in the budgeting process, it will be difficult to find common ground in the discussion of the APBD which will lead to delays in the stages of the budgeting process resulting in delays in establishing the APBD. The deadline for setting the APBD as well as the strict sanctions imposed by the central government on regions that are late in establishing the APBD (in line with the enactment of Law number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government) have contributed greatly to the timely determination of the APBD in regions in Indonesia.

## **CONCLUSION**

The APBD of the next fiscal year must be determined one month before the end of the previous fiscal year. The leadership factor of the regional head and DPRD leadership as well as strict sanctions for regions that are late in setting the APBD in the form of non-payment of salaries for the regional head and DPRD members for six months, make a big contribution for the regions to determine the APBD on time. Conflicts of interest, alternating budget allocations in the discussion of the regional budget draft regional budget is a necessity. However, it should be based on a shared desire to carry out development and improve people's welfare, as well as accountability to the people and God Almighty, the opportunistic behavior of those in authority in determining the APBD can be minimized.

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